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The practice of history in law is a time honored tradition in American 
jurisprudence. Since the Constitution’s inception, lawyers and jurists have relied on 
history, in one form or another, to adjudicate constitutional questions and 
controversies.1 It is a practice that has been categorized under many subheadings, to 
include historicism, intentionalism, interpretivist history, and historical narrative.2 
Today the practice has become more popular than ever with the rise of originalism, a 
form of constitutional interpretation and construction that views the Constitution’s 
text as a past to be preserved for use in the present.3 Originalism means different 
things to different people. For some, originalism is about resurrecting the intentions 
of the delegates who drafted and framed the Constitution or what is otherwise 
                                                           
 * Patrick J. Charles is the author of numerous articles and books on the Constitution, legal 
history, and standards of review, Charles received his L.L.M. in Legal Theory and History 
from Queen Mary University of London, J.D. from Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, and 
his B.A. in History and International Affairs from George Washington University. Charles 
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 1 See PATRICK J. CHARLES, HISTORICISM, ORIGINALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE USE 
AND ABUSE OF THE PAST IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 1-31 (McFarland Publishing 2014).  
 2 See Robert W. Gordon, The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1023 
(1997); Martin H. Redish, Interpretivism and the Judicial Role in a Constitutional 
Democracy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 525 (1996); William M. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: 
The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W.  L. REV. 227 (1987); 
William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 
1237 (1986); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism 
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983); Raoul Berger, Mark Tushnet’s Critique 
of Interpretivism, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 532 (1983); Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in 
Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981); John Hart Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its 
Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1977); Roger S. Ruffin, The Constitution and the 
Dilemma of Historicism, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 171 (1969); John Phillip Reid, Legal History, 
1966 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 669 (1966); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love 
Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (1965); Paul Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current 
Challenge of American Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64 (1963). 
 3 PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 59 (Yale University Press 1992). 
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referred to as original intent.4 For others, originalism is about how the Constitution’s 
text and provisions were understood by the generation that adopted it or what has 
been referred to as the new originalism.5 Then there are originalists that believe the 
only way to be faithful to the Constitution, and its prescription for a republican form 
of government, is to apply the interpretive rules of those who adopted it or what is 
referred to as original methods originalism.6 To restate this last premise more 
succinctly, original methods originalism requires interpreting a 1787 constitutional 
provision according to late eighteenth-century rules, interpreting a 1868 
constitutional provision according to mid to late nineteenth-century rules, and so 
forth. There are indeed variations and nuances to these and other originalist 
methodologies,7 but whatever variety of originalism is applied, the overarching 
premise is similar given that originalists advocate the Constitution should be 
interpreted according to a set of fixed and unalterable principles.8 This in turn limits 
judicial activism and allows the constitutional amendment process to fix any 
undesirable results.9 
Originalists sometimes claim originalism has always existed in one form or 
another since the Constitution’s ratification,10 but there is no substantiated evidence, 
                                                           
 4 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 143-60 (Free Press 1997). 
 5 See, e.g., Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 
(2004). 
 6 See JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION (Harvard University Press 2013); John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, 
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against 
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 751 (2009); John O. McGinnis and Michael 
Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 
371, 372 (2007). 
 7 See James E. Fleming, Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral 
Readings of the American Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1174 (2012). See also Thomas 
B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 244 (2009) (“A review of 
originalists’ work reveals originalism to be not a single, coherent, unified theory of 
constitutional interpretation, but rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that 
share little in common except a misleading reliance on a single label.”). 
 8 Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 
412 (2013) (“Originalism stands for the proposition that the meaning of a written constitution 
should remain the same until it is properly changed.”); Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A 
Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 377-78 (2013) (stating originalists agree that 
the text “historically fixed” is at the heart of originalism); MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, 
ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 117 (“Originalist theories argue 
that the actual meaning of the Constitution is fixed as of the time of its enactment.”). 
 9 For a more in depth discussion, see LAWRENCE B. SOLUM & ROBERT W. BENNETT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1-35, 84-119 (Cornell University Press 2011). See 
also Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional 
Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 156 (2012) (“The fixation thesis and the constraint principle 
constitute the core of contemporary originalist thought.”). 
 10 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 79 (West 2012); see also MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 126-33; Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of 
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at least in total historical context, to support it.11 The truth of the matter is 
originalism is a revival, or one might argue evolution, of a late nineteenth-century 
and early twentieth-century debate over constitutional interpretation that centered on 
whether history can pinpoint a set of fixed and unalterable principles to interpret the 
Constitution.12 It was a debate historians dismissed given the complexities of 
importing the past for use in the present, and the wide acceptance of the common 
law approach to constitutional interpretation.13 Historian Charles A. Beard, for one, 
dismissed the view of lawyers and laymen that asserted the “provisions of the 
Constitution are clear and fixed—like or similar to the multiplication table or natural 
science.”14 While Beard expressed “no doubt” that a number of constitutional 
provisions were intended to be rigid, he maintained reservations concerning the 
Constitution’s “broad and general” clauses such as “due process of law, life, liberty 
and property, commerce among the states, general welfare, and privileges and 
immunities.”15 Beard was also concerned with the dilemma of multiple meanings. 
There would always be instances where jurists must choose between competing 
interpretations. It was primarily for this reason that Beard felt characterizing the 
Constitution as “changeless” to be without substance.16     
Prominent English jurist and historian Sir Frederick Pollock was another early 
voice to dismiss the notion that the Constitution was intended to be changeless.  
According to Pollock, history showed how it was not unusual for new generations of 
lawyers to regard the system they are trained in as “a monster of inhuman 
perfection.”17 Pollock was particularly defensive when lawyers asserted the need to 
cast out the common law approach to constitutional interpretation, where precedent 
and reason dictated the results. In Pollock’s mind, to cast out the common law 
                                                           
Independence, and the Constitution: A Unique Role in Constitutional Interpretation?, 111 
PENN ST. L. REV. 413, 438-39, 447 (2006). 
 11 See generally JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION (Alfred A. Knopf 1996). See also Lorianne Updike Toler, J. Carl 
Cecere, & Justice Don Willett, Pre-“Originalism,” 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 277, 304 
(2012) (showing originalist methodologies were not employed following the ratification of the 
Constitution); Sister Marie Carolyn Klinkhamer, The Use of History in the Supreme Court, 
1789-1835, 36 U. DET. L.J. 553 (1959) (showing the early Justices of the Supreme Court used 
history to explain the path of the law); Sister Marie Carolyn Klinkhamer, John Marshall’s Use 
of History, 6 CATH. U. L. REV. 78, 88-95 (1956) (showing how John Marshall used history 
sparingly and did not employ it as an outcome determinative tool). 
 12 CHARLES, supra note 1, at 7. 
 13 See, e.g., Julius Goebel, Jr., Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM. 
L. REV. 555 (1938). 
 14 Charles A. Beard, The Act of Constitutional Interpretation, 1 NAT’L LAW. GUILD Q. 9, 
12 (1937). 
 15 Id. at 13. 
 16 Id. at 14. For more on the view that Charles A. Beard dismissed originalism before it 
ever came to fruition, see R.B. Bernstein, Charles A. Beard: Foe of Originalism, 2 AM. POL. 
THOUGHT 302 (2013); Adrian Vermeule, Beard and Holmes on Constitutional Adjudication, 
CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2014). 
 17 Frederick Pollock, The Genius of the Common Law I: Our Lady and Her Knights, 12 
COLUM. L. REV. 189, 189 (1912). 
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approach was rooted in arrogance. “But the dogmatic assertion that law is the 
perfection of reason belongs to a later age,” wrote Pollock, “an age of antiquarian 
reverence often falling into superstition and of technical learning often corrupted by 
pedantry.”18  
This is not to say Beard, Pollock, and later historians dismissed the use of history 
in law outright. It was quite the opposite. Historians understood that history was a 
valuable and irresistible tool from which to legally reason.19 The reservation 
historians maintained with the practice was history of the “law office” variety—the 
selection and manipulation of historical data favorable to a predisposed legal 
position—for by quoting and selecting history the courts made history.20 Therefore, 
historians proposed that the legal academy seek a more sophisticated and restrained 
approach.21 What this entailed was employing the evidentiary record in historical 
context, but only in a minority of cases, thus preventing the use and abuse of history 
to advance judicial philosophies.22 
In the years that followed, the Supreme Court somewhat adhered to the historical 
academy’s call for a more restrained approach to history in law,23 however, in the 
minority of cases where history was used, the legal academy made little, if any, 
improvement of its employment of historical methodologies, especially limiting 
history of the law office variety.24 It was in the midst of this practice that original 
intent originalism thrust itself into the debate over constitutional interpretation. 
Whether originalists forgot or just ignored the preceding debates over history in 
law,25 original intent proponents claimed the history of those who drafted and framed 
the Constitution’s text was the key to unlocking the correct interpretation of 
constitutional provisions. In response, historians and legal critics showed the 
difficulties in pinpointing the collective intentions of those who drafted and 
approved the Constitution.26 By the time historians and legal critics had exposed 
                                                           
 18 Id. at 190. 
 19 See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL 
NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) xxxiii-xxxiv (Patterson Smith 
1944); Murphy, supra note 2, at 72-79. 
 20 Kelly, supra note 2, at 122. 
 21 Id. at 157. 
 22 Id. at 158. 
 23 See, e.g., Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., History and Law, U. CHI. L. REV. 237, 239 (1959). 
 24 For some discussions, see Buckner F. Melton, Clio at the Bar: A Guide to Historical 
Method for Legists and Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377, 434 (1998); Neil M. Richards, Clio and 
the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court’s Uses of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 818 
(1997); CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (Harvard 
University Press 1969). 
 25 Even before originalism came to the forefront in the late 1970s, such a methodology of 
interpreting the Constitution was sufficiently challenged. See, e.g., John G. Wofford, The 
Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 
(1964). 
 26 There are numerous criticisms of original intent, but for some of the more prominent, 
see Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of 
Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 351-52 (1989); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL 
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original intent as the pathetic fallacy27 it was, however, originalist proponents had 
refocused their approach by centering on the original meaning or original 
understanding of the Constitution’s text. Known as the “new originalism,” the 
interpretational approach was born from the understanding that the Constitution was 
ratified by consent of “the people,” and could not solely revolve around what the 
drafters and framers thought at the 1787 Constitutional Convention.28 Instead, the 
historical net needed to be cast wider to include how the public understood the 
Constitution at the point in time the provision was drafted, debated, and ratified. To 
be clear, what mattered most was the linguistic usage of constitutional text among 
those who wrote and ratified the text, as well as the general public to whom the 
Constitution addressed.29 But here too what new originalists have claimed as an 
objective approach to decoding the Constitution has proven to be another false idol.30 
Perhaps the greatest objectivity issue with new originalism remains that its 
textually-oriented methodologies do little to prevent subjective outcomes,31 
particularly given that a number of originalists perform the task of recreating a 
hypothetical reasonable person that lived during the period a respective 
constitutional provision was drafted, debated or ratified.32 This is objectively 
problematic on a number of levels. First and foremost, as constitutional historian 
Saul Cornell has pointed out, the varieties of legal interpretation that can be found in 
any historical era are numerous.33 Certainly not every interpretation can be 
                                                           
INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION (Macmillan Publishers 1988); H. Jefferson Powell, 
Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). 
 27 I have borrowed this characterization to describe originalism from the late English 
historian Herbert Butterfield, who used the term to describe Whiggish history. In my opinion, 
originalism and Whiggish history suffer from similar defects. See HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE 
WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 20 (1931). 
 28 This approach to constitutional interpretation is often credited to or draws from the 
writings of James Madison. See RAKOVE, supra note 11, at 17-18, 352-53, 362-64; LEVY, 
supra note 26, at 5, 20-29. 
 29 See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service 
in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239-40 (2004). 
 30 See, e.g., Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. the Lawyer’s Constitution: 
Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate Over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 295 (2011). 
 31 See Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 331, 345-65 
(2013); Jack Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public 
Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO. L. REV. 575, 578 (2011) (“Whether originalism does 
more to constrain than liberate would be hard to measure.”). 
 32 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: 
Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1559 (2012);  see also 
Barnett, supra note 8, at 413-15. 
 33 See Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 626-31 (2008); see also Larry Kramer, Two (More) 
Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907 (2008); Caleb Nelson, 
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003). 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
28 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:23 
 
categorized as reasonable or dominant.34 The hypothetical reasonable person 
construct also fails because this historical reader is unidentifiable, for this imaginary 
person is constructed in the visionary mind of the respective originalist.35  
Essentially, what it boils down to is new originalism’s hypothetical reasonable 
person construct raises the dilemma of subjective outcomes. It is no secret that the 
same type of originalist inquiry can lead to competing results, all dependent on the 
methodologies employed by the researcher, including the manner and order the 
empirical questions are asked and answered.36 From the historian’s perspective, this 
often results from a lack of historical consciousness or when the inquirer reads his or 
her own predilections from the evidentiary record.37 To borrow from Detroit Mercy 
law professor and originalist critic Bret Boyce, it should “not be surprising that 
public meaning originalists . . . reach such dramatically divergent conclusions about . 
. . proper [constitutional] interpretation and construction,” for when “they peer into 
the magic mirror of [constitutional] meaning, originalists tend to see their own 
political philosophies and ideological presumptions.”38 
Lastly, there is the matter of new originalist outcomes contradicting what a 
thorough historical inquiry provides. A notable example is the First Amendment’s 
Press Clause. Just recently, UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh claimed an 
originalist inquiry confirms the founding generation foresaw the Press Clause as 
enshrining a right to print technology, and then suggested there is no substantiated 
historical evidence showing that the founding generation interpreted the Press Clause 
as guaranteeing any press freedoms.39 Volokh’s originalist conclusion, however, is 
deeply problematic given two indisputable historical truths. First and foremost, the 
technological vehicle of printing books, pamphlets, and newspapers remained 
unchanged from the late seventeenth century through the Early Republic. With only 
one publishing technology having been made available up through the late 
eighteenth century, it is impossible for Volokh to conclude the founding generation 
                                                           
 34 Cornell, supra note 30, at 295-304; see also Gordon Wood, Rhetoric and Reality in the 
American Revolution, 23 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1966) (discussing the historian’s dilemma when 
separating political propaganda, changing arguments, and political realities). 
 35 Rakove, supra note 31, at 584-86. 
 36 The Fourteenth Amendment is a case in point. See generally Bret Boyce, The Magic 
Mirror of “Original Meaning”: Recent Approaches to the Fourteenth Amendment, 66 ME. L. 
REV. 29 (2013). 
 37 See J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND 
METHOD 3–20, 189 (Cambridge University Press 2009); J.G.A. Pocock, British History: A 
Plea for a New Subject, 47 J. MOD. HIST. 601, 614-15 (1975). 
 38 Boyce, supra note 36, at 36. Brett Boyce is not the first to make this kind of 
observation. Following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Henry Reed made a 
similar line of argument. See Henry Reed, American Constitution in 1787 and 1866, 2 THE 
INT’L REV. 604, 619 (1875). 
 39 Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a 
Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2011). For a recent 
application of Volokh’s thesis to potential Press Clause jurisprudence, see Michael W. 
McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 432-
447 (2013) (arguing that history does not support recognizing any organizational press 
freedoms). 
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viewed the Press Clause as an evolving technological right of “the people” to employ 
free speech. Such a conclusion is nothing more than Volokh imprinting his modern 
libertarian values onto the past. Second, Volokh’s originalist claim is undermined by 
the evidentiary record that most originalist inquiries seem to overlook, particularly 
through a detailed intellectual and ideological historical inquiry. In terms of the Press 
Clause, the historical evidence suggests that both the public and printers viewed the 
“liberty of the press” as providing some protections to acquire and print information 
on matters of public concern.40 This is not to say that every person in the late 
eighteenth century perceived the Press Clause in this light, but there is evidence 
suggesting that many did. 
The constitutional scope of the Press Clause is just one of many examples of 
originalist constructs resulting in subjective outcomes. And, of course, originalism, 
in any of its forms, is not the only culprit when it comes to substituting one’s 
personal beliefs as historical fact. Originalism is merely the most popular means 
employed today.41 It seeks to persuade us that the generation who drafted, framed, 
debated, and ratified a respective constitutional provision would have agreed with 
whatever outcome the originalist proclaims to be true. But again, more often than 
not, the results end up replacing facts with myths.42    
The practice of recasting constitutional history to conform to one’s own 
predilections first grew to prominence in the seventeenth century.43 It was a practice 
employed during the Constitution’s ratification in 1789, but became even more 
prominent near the turn of the nineteenth century with the rise of the Jeffersonian 
Republicans.44 And it is a practice that continues today whenever politicians, 
lawyers, jurists, and pundits substitute their personal views as historical fact. 
Lawyers regularly perform this task in court pleadings when they ask the judiciary to 
accept historical source “X” or “Y” as binding legitimate authority, while, at the 
same time, requesting the judiciary to ignore others. The same holds true for jurists 
who rely on certain facets of the evidentiary record to support the outcome of case, 
all the while denouncing, rejecting or discounting others.45 In either instance, the 
                                                           
 40 For a full discussion on the history of the “liberty of the press,” see Patrick J. Charles & 
Kevin F. O’Neill, Saving the Press Clause from Ruin: The Customary Origins of a “Free 
Press” as Interface to the Present and Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1691 (2012). 
 41 Originalism in many ways has become intertwined with popular constitutionalism. For 
some discussions, see Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism?: The Tea Party Movement 
and Constitutional Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483 (2012); Todd E. Pettys, Popular 
Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People Be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 313 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in 
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008); see also Eric A. Posner, Why Originalism Is So 
Popular, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 2011, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/81480/ 
republicans-constitution-originalism-popular. 
 42 See, e.g., RAY RAPHAEL, CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHS: WHAT WE GET WRONG AND HOW TO 
GET IT RIGHT (New Press 2013). 
 43 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF 
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (Cambridge University Press 
1957). 
 44 Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, supra note 26, at 924-35. 
 45 Wiecek, supra note 2, at 227-28. 
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result is the acceptance of historical myth in lieu of historical fact. The question 
moving forward, and what this article seeks to answer, is when, if ever, is the use of 
myth a constitutionally legitimate enterprise.   
Given that the act of modifying the dead hand of the past to meet the desires of 
the present has been practiced for centuries, it may be argued that substituting 
historical myth for fact is already a constitutionally legitimate enterprise. There are 
two problems, however, with this statement. First, jurists who have practiced or 
currently practice history in law, no matter the respective case or controversy, do not 
openly admit to modifying the past for use in the present. To do so would reveal 
their subjective leanings and ultimately call into question the legitimacy of their 
analysis. Second, even though a respective jurist may, in fact, have advanced false 
notions of history—at the time the jurist wrote or joined the opinion—the jurist 
generally believes he or she is being a good steward of the past. Otherwise, he or she 
would not have written or joined the opinion in the first place.46   
Still, one may assert that modifying the past to adjudicate constitutional 
questions and controversies is in line with the practice of living and popular 
constitutionalism, i.e. interpreting the Constitution in line with the beliefs, views, 
and needs of the present. This is a valid response if, and only if, constitutional 
interpretation is limited to notions of living and popular constitutionalism, and it is 
acknowledged that the past is nothing more than a subcontractor for use in the 
present. American constitutional jurisprudence, however, has never been solely 
based on the doctrines of living and popular constitutionalism.47 As it stands today, 
there are indeed a number of opinions, holdings, and legal precedents that reflect 
notions of living and popular constitutionalism, but there are an equal number of 
opinions, holdings, and legal tests that emphasize the importance of history, custom, 
and tradition.48  
It is in these latter instances that the use of historical myth in lieu of historical 
fact is facially illegitimate. If one pauses to consider, it is impossible to proclaim that 
any historically based argument is legitimate if it contradicts what a thorough 
examination of the evidentiary record provides.49 It is the equivalent of a court 
                                                           
 46 For some useful discussions on history in law by jurists, see Amanda L. Taylor et al., A 
Dialogue with Federal Judges on the Role of History in Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1889 (2012); Jeffrey S. Sutton, The Role of History in Judging Disputes About the 
Meaning of the Constitution, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1173 (2009); Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith 
and Credit: The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945). 
 47 See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 401 (2006); DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (Oxford University Press 
2010). 
 48 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning the First and Seventh Amendments 
illustrates this point succinctly. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What 
the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852 (2013); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS 
L.J. 901(1993);  see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (stating 
the appropriate limits of constitutional rights and governmental power “come not from 
drawing arbitrary lines, but rather a careful ‘respect for the teachings of history [and], solid 
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.’”). 
 49 Helen Irving, Constitutional Interpretation, the High Court, and the Discipline of 
History, 41 FED. L. REV. 95, 124-25 (2013). 
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deciding a civil or criminal case based upon inaccurate or false statements. For in 
those civil and criminal cases where a court lays an inaccurate factual foundation, 
the subsequent legal analysis and holding will most certainly be insufficiently 
reasoned and therefore illegitimate.50 In the words of late eighteenth-century jurist 
and Supreme Court Justice James Wilson, “The more accuarately and the more 
ingeniously men reason, and the farther they pursue their reasonings, from false 
principles, the more numerous and inveterate will their inconsistencies, nay, their 
absurdities be.”51 This baseline principle equally applies when historical myths are 
incorporated into the constitutional equation. Any subsequent legal analysis and 
holding will create an illegitimate foundation. But unlike the typical civil and 
criminal case, incorporating historical myths into constitutional jurisprudence can 
have far reaching negative effects in both law and society.52  
The legal and societal repercussions of substituting historical myth in lieu of 
historical fact are often ignored by members of the legal academy.53 Originalists, 
however, have countered historians’ concerns of “law office history” by arguing it is 
better than the alternative, “history office law” or inquiring into the meaning of the 
Constitution, yet neglecting the distinctive aspects of the legal task at hand.54 Thus, 
according to originalists, because historians are not trained legal professionals, it is 
historians that are the greater threat to objective constitutional interpretation.55 To 
state it in even simpler terms, many members of the legal academy perceive 
themselves as being better equipped to interpret historical legal texts than 
historians.56  
This dismissal of historians is actually commonplace among originalists, but it is 
a hypocritical and unsupported argument.57 It remains unclear why it is acceptable 
                                                           
 50 CHARLES, supra note 1, at 87. 
 51 JAMES WILSON, 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 467 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark 
David Hall eds., 2007). 
 52 David Thomas Konig, Heller, Guns, and History: The Judicial Invention of Tradition, 3 
NE. U. L.J. 175, 177-78 (2011). 
 53 Of course, not every member of the legal academy has ignored the subject. See Matthew 
J. Festa, Applying a Usable Past: The Use of History in Law, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 479 
(2008); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (Yale University Press 
1996); Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601 (1995). 
 54 Lawson, supra note 32, at 1559; Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without 
Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 534 (1998). 
 55 See Michael Rappaport, History Office Law, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Dec. 27, 2010), 
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2010/12/recently-i-linked-to-this-op-ed-by-
distinguished-historian-pauline-meier-the-piece-defended-justice-breyers-comments-on-the.html.  
 56 Randy Barnett, Can Lawyers Ascertain the Original Meaning of the Constitution?, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/19/can-lawyers-
ascertain-the-original-meaning-of-the-constitution/; Lawson, supra note 32, at 1559; 
Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 115 (Univ. Ill. Coll. Of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, NO. 07-24, 2008). OR Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic 
Originalism, at 34 (Nov. 22, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. 
(citation taken from Strang’s article). 
 57 See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, Lawyers Masquerading as Historians, BALKINIZATION 
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/ 
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for the legal community to make legal claims about historical text, which often end 
up contradicting what a thorough historical inquiry provides, yet it is unacceptable 
for historians specializing in a particular era to perform the same task, especially in 
cases where historical context is elicited to the greatest detail.58 According to 
originalists, we should accept this academic double standard for two reasons. First, 
given the Constitution’s language has not changed that much in two hundred years, 
legal professionals are better suited to interpret legal texts. Second, the employment 
of historical methodologies and constructs “without legal training” generally leads to 
“dumb results.”59 
These types of criticisms are a revelation to intellectual historians who specialize 
in the interpretation of texts, to include their philosophical origins, meaning, and 
influence in the public discourse, politics, and law.  But even if originalists are 
correct that the meaning of the Constitution’s text has not changed that much, the 
overarching body of law existing at a particular time, to include the culture and 
society with which it operates, has changed substantially. One cannot merely extract 
those legal principles and lessons one likes and discard the others. Legal principles 
all operate in conjunction within their respective era. This is what makes history in 
law such a contentious topic among historians who see it as their duty to preserve the 
past, for originalists often only want to carry forward those portions of the past they 
agree with and discard the remainder. The overarching point here is a simple one. 
Unless originalists can identify something more, some ethical or functionality 
problem with the use of history in context to correct the problems associated with 
originalism or “law office history” in general, claims of “history office law” are 
more nominal than real.  
Essentially the “history office law” argument is the equivalent of proclaiming 
less information about the past produces better outcomes than more information. 
Somehow we are more enlightened, as to the Constitution’s meaning and purpose, if 
we focus intently on what its text means (or can make it mean) and subordinate the 
larger social, political, intellectual, ideological, and philosophical considerations that 
took place. It is a nonsensical argument seeing that many of the Constitution’s 
phrases and terms of art embody much broader legal, intellectual, and philosophical 
                                                           
lawyers-masquerading-as-historians.html (“A historian of the Founding era is no better at 
determining how we should interpret the Constitution than a lawyer. Much more than history 
goes into that task. To be sure, history is a useful tool, and historians should step up to correct 
inaccurate information that lawyers are using.”). 
 58 See generally Rakove, supra note 31, at 575-600 (dissenting to original and semantic 
meaning originalism on contextual grounds). 
 59 Randy Barnett, My Fed Soc Panel on Textualist Interpretation, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.volokh.com/2013/11/19/fed-soc-panel-textualist-
interpretation/. Barnett was clarifying what he meant at a Federalist Society event. See, e.g., 
Randy E. Barnett, Showcase Panel II: Textualism and Constitutional Interpretation, Statement 
Before the Federalist Society 2013 National Lawyers Convention 14:18 (Nov. 15, 2013), 
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/events/page/2013-national-lawyers-convention-schedule. 
(“Ask a historian what the meaning of a legal text is in history, and you know what, unless 
they are a trained lawyer they are not going to be able to tell you something that is very 
helpful about it. Historians stock and trade is not legal interpretation. They are very bad at it. 
They just say stupid things about legal interpretation, while they are saying wonderful things 
about the periods they are studying. You need to be a lawyer in order to interpret legal 
texts.”). 
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principles than what any textually based inquiry will illuminate.60 This does not even 
consider the jurisprudential consequences which may result from poor historical 
paradigms.61  
The intellectual and philosophical development of a free press circa the late 
eighteenth century has already provided us with one illustration on this point. It is, 
however, worth providing another, such as the Second Amendment’s reference to a 
“well regulated Militia.”62 If one subscribes to new originalist methodologies—
which, according to Barnett, lead us to “discover an empirical fact”63—the phrase 
“well regulated Militia” was a synonym for “well trained,” embodied the promise of 
an “armed citizenry,” and cannot be read as limiting the “right of the people to keep 
and bear arms” in any way.64 For contemporary readers unfamiliar with late 
eighteenth-century society and law the conclusion makes sense.65 How are they to 
know the intricacies of a “well regulated Militia” in late eighteenth-century terms?  
For those historians who specialize in the rich history of standing armies and 
militias from the sixteenth century through the turn of the nineteenth century, 
however, such a construct is in direct contradiction to republican liberty. It would 
make an “unregulated” or “ill-regulated” militia the historical equivalent of a well-
regulated one.66 This is highly problematic seeing that a “well regulated Militia” was 
intended to provide constitutional balance and united the people in defense of their 
rights, liberties, and property in order to extol Machiavelli’s virtù and unite the 
people as a common community. It was a state-sanctioned constitutional body 
capable of bearing arms so men could train together in the art of war and foster an 
esprit de corps. Such a body of citizen soldiers needed to be professionally 
disciplined and trained, for this, and this only, prevented the establishment of 
standing armies and provided a constitutional check on the federal government.67 
                                                           
 60 See, e.g., Irving, supra note 49, at 123 (criticizing how a textualist focus “reveals 
nothing about the context or purpose of the object” being examined). 
 61 Charles & O’Neill, supra note 40, at 1751-52. 
 62 U.S. CONST., amend. II. 
 63 Barnett, supra note 8, at 415. 
 64 See Barnett, supra note 29, at 273-77; see also David T. Hardy, Ducking the Bullet: 
District of Columbia v. Heller and the Stevens Dissent, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 61, 
67 (2010); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 85, 144 (2d ed., 1994); David I. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The 
Second Amendment Revisited, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31 (1976).  
 65 Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Believes Americans Have Right to Own Guns, GALLUP (Mar. 27, 
2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/105721/public-believes-americans-right-own-guns.aspx. 
 66 See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN 
AMERICA (Oxford University Press 2006); LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 
1689 74-78 (John Hopkins University Press 1981); H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. 
MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL 
SILENT (Duke University Press 2003). 
 67 See Patrick J. Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia” 
Asserted and Proven with Commentary on the Future of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 3 
NE. U. L.J. 1, 9-85 (2011); Patrick J. Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, the Second 
Amendment, and Individual Militia Rights: A Legal and Historical Perspective, 9 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 323, 374-90 (2011). 
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Here again we find an example of how originalism, particularly its adherence to 
textualist methodologies, can result in an illegitimate understanding of the past.68  
Constitutional constructs are illegitimate when they are based on illegitimate 
historical foundations. Eliciting historical context to the greatest detail is the only 
means of alleviating this dilemma.69 It provides a far more legitimate guidepost to 
reason and creates constitutional constructs. As I have outlined elsewhere, when 
applying history in law the goal should be to employ the evidentiary record 
thoroughly, accurately, and objectively. This in turn provides the best foundation 
from which to legally reason.70  
History is not, has never been, nor should it ever be the entire means and ends of 
constitutional interpretation.71 There are just too many unknowns and unanswered 
questions for history to be law’s sole driving force. History is much better suited as a 
philosophical and moral guide towards understanding the law’s development.72 This 
in turn minimizes mythmaking and the creation of poor constitutional constructs. 
This does not mean, however, that to legally reason from subjective historical 
accounts or myth can never be a legitimate enterprise. Before exploring this issue, 
though, one must distinguish between what constitutes myth and the pursuit of an 
objective historical account, particularly within the construct of history in law.  
                                                           
 68 In terms of the Second Amendment, the failure rests on originalists’ inability to conduct 
a thorough ideological or intellectual historical investigation. It is a problem that persists to 
this day. See, e.g., Barnett, Showcase Panel II, supra note 59, at 14:18 (stating, “[l]ike those 
who previously defended the collective rights interpretation [of the Second Amendment], 
proponents of the new militia conditioned individual right were unable to produce a single 
example of anyone, during the founding period, who said this was the meaning of the right to 
keep and bear arms. In short, they could not provide a single example of anyone who they 
expressed everyone claimed everyone held…”). For an historical refutation of Barnett’s claim, 
see Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in Historiographical Crisis: Why the Supreme 
Court Must Reevaluate the Embarrassing “Standard Model” Moving Forward, 39 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1727, 1336-46, 1761-67 (2012). 
 69 This applies to the interpretation of legal texts. One must not only focus on the text to be 
interpreted, but also on the issues or themes which the text is concerned and the larger mental 
world from which it is derived. See Quentin Skinner, Motives, Intentions and the 
Interpretation of Texts, 3 NEW LITERARY HISTORY 393, 406-7 (1972).   
 70 Rakove, supra note 31, at 580 (“[T]he only possible way in which one could 
satisfactorily reconstruct the original meaning of a constitutional text must necessarily involve 
an essentially historical inquiry. Such an inquiry would have to take careful account of the 
sources, explaining how and why a document was drafted, debated, and finally approved. It 
would involve immersion in the kinds of sources that historians ordinarily use and would need 
to consider the array of purposes shaping their action.”). 
 71 This is not to say history cannot affect constitutional outcomes. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. 
Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 410 (1856); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Myth-Making: Lessons 
from the Dred Scott Case, The Univ. of Chicago Law School Occasional Paper No. 37, 2 
(1996) (“Dred Scott was one of the first great cases unambiguously using the ‘intent of the 
framers’ . . . .”). 
 72 CHARLES, supra note 1, at 85-86; see Wofford, supra note 25, at 528-33. Recently, 
constitutional historian Saul Cornell has put forth a similar argument by stating the “basic 
methods of intellectual history” offer a more honest approach to understanding the 
Constitution’s origins than originalism; see also Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in 
the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (2013). 
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I. HISTORY, MYTH, AND HISTORY IN LAW: A DISCOURSE 
Defining what constitutes myth and history has been an ongoing debate among 
historians for over a century. The debate centers on whether there can truly ever be 
such a thing as an objective historical account.73 Given that all historical inquiries 
grow out of the respective historian’s ideological mind, it is argued the writing of 
history is not so much about truth-seeking as it is about the ideological leanings of 
the respective historian. In other words, critics of objective history frequently claim 
that one historian’s truth is another’s falsity.74 What drives this criticism is the 
frequency in which historical narratives can change. But shifts in historical 
narratives are not so much driven by the respective historian’s subjectivity or 
personal bias, but by academic curiosity. Historians are asking more questions than 
ever from a variety of social and intellectual viewpoints. These inquiries continue to 
develop because up to the mid nineteenth century nationalistic historical narratives 
were hindering an objective understanding of the past.75 Not only did these narratives 
oversimplify the complexities of a particular event or era, they reconstructed the past 
through the lens of the present, not through the lens of the time period in question.76   
In any case there is an argument to be made that all history is myth and all myth 
is history.77 No matter how much of the evidentiary record is uncovered, no historian 
can ever fully reconstruct the past as it was. In their totality, those moments in 
history are lost forever. The best any historian can do is build upon those evidentiary 
remnants which remain. Still, at one level or another, historians will have to make a 
number of assumptions about the past. In some instances the assumptions will be 
small or minute because the evidentiary record is rich with information about the 
past, allowing the respective historian to recreate an event or time period in 
excruciating detail. In other instances the assumptions can be substantial, especially 
when the evidentiary record is barren, requiring the respective historian to fill the 
evidentiary gaps.  But whenever historians make any assumptions about the past—
whether they are minor or substantial—they are perpetuating myth in some form or 
another. 
Considering this fact, it is understandable when critics of history in law denounce 
the practice as being replete with errors and unreliable.78 To completely remove 
                                                           
 73 See generally PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE ‘OBJECTIVITY QUESTION’ AND 
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (Cambridge University Press 1998). 
 74 William H. McNeill, Mythistory, or Truth, Myth, History, and Historians, 91 THE AM. 
HIST. REV. 1, 1 (1986). 
 75 For a detailed discussion, see JOYCE APPLEBY, LYNN HUNT, & MARGARET JACOB, 
TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 198-270 (W.W. Norton & Company 1994); 
see also Joyce Appleby, The Power of History, 103 THE AM. HIST. REV. 1 (1998); Irving, 
supra note 49, at 100-102. 
 76 As historian Herbert Butterfield aptly observed in 1931: “Real historical understanding 
is not achieved by the subordination of the past to the present, but rather by making the past 
our present and attempting to see life with the eyes of another century than our own.” 
BUTTERFIELD, supra note 27, at 16. 
 77 For some discussions on this point, see Jonathan Friedman, Myth, History, and Political 
Identity, 7 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 194 (1992); M.I. Finley, Myth, Memory, and History, 4 
HIST. & THEORY 281 (1965). 
 78 See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 47, at 7-32. 
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
36 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:23 
 
history in law from the interpretational process, however, is to undo the law itself. If 
one pauses to consider how case facts, judicial precedent, and legal text all embody 
facets of history, one cannot dispute that history is the law and the law is history.79 
The two disciplines are inseparable. There are indeed objectivity problems with the 
general practice of history in law, but as long as these problems are acknowledged 
and the practice is reformed in a way that minimizes subjectivity to the greatest 
extent, history in law can provide an invaluable tool from which to legally reason. In 
the words of the late Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., despite the problems associated with 
history in law, there is in “history a meaning, and a meaning that has value for law, 
as it has for the spirit of man in many another aspect.”80 History not only provides us 
with “another perspective or value against which to measure law,” but it also 
“teaches us the nature of legitimate authority.”81  
What qualifies as “history” among legal professionals as compared to historians 
are often two different things.82 What many legal professionals deem as history is 
what historians would classify as “law office history” or historical myth. In a panel 
discussion before Ohio University, Pulitzer Prize winning historian Gordon S. Wood 
recently articulated this line of argument, particularly as it applied to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, stating: 
I have no doubt that the Supreme Court should use history and will use 
history, but there is no doubt in my mind also that it’s not really history 
that the justices are using. It’s not the history that historians write, and I 
would go beyond that and say it’s impossible for jurists, law professors, 
and Supreme Court justices—or judges anywhere—to really use history. 
It simply would not work. Judges have to invent another kind of history: 
We call it “law office history,” or “history lite.” It’s a necessary fiction, 
and I don’t consider that to be a bad thing. It’s a necessary fiction for 
judges and other jurists to get along with their work—they need some 
kind of history to work with. History is much too complicated to be used 
effectively by judges and the courts.83 
Wood’s observation that the practice of history in law is not really history is 
worth noting, but it is an outdated criticism.84 Certainly most historians would agree 
with Wood that the general practice of history in law is rife with subjective 
intentions. But there have been instances where legal professionals have produced 
excellent histories or where jurists have invoked history in law responsibly, 
                                                           
 79 Festa, supra note 53, at 483-85; MILLER, supra note 24, at 20-21. 
 80 Wyzanski, Jr., supra note 23, at 244. 
 81 Id.; see also Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 
395 (2003) (“When lawyers, judges, and legal scholars turn to history, they do so because they 
believe, and want their readers to believe, that an historical pedigree adds authority to their 
argument.”). 
 82 See, e.g., John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 195-97 (1993). 
 83 Gordon S. Wood & Scott D. Gerber, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 39 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 435, 443 (2013). 
 84 See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1997). 
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especially where history is a moral and philosophical guidepost to the law’s 
development.85 To characterize the invocation of history in these latter instances as 
“law office history” or “history lite” would be improper.  
What Wood also fails to mention is that one cannot solely point the finger at 
legal professionals for the problems associated with history in law. For decades, 
professional historians gave little attention to the fields of legal and constitutional 
history. It was not until the rise of originalism, in the late twentieth century, that 
historians became deeply troubled by the problems originalist methodologies 
present. Today, given originalism is more prominent than ever, it is as if every 
constitutional provision is being explored through some form of history in law.86 
This is indeed a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, it is a curse given that the 
majority of these inquiries do not adhere to the primary rule of any historical 
inquiry—understanding the past for the sake of the past. At the same time, these 
inquiries are a blessing in disguise because they provide historians with an infinite 
number of topics from which to reexamine the past. The more historians explore 
such topics, the more accurate, objective, and therefore legitimate the practice of 
history in law will become. As historian Paul Murphy remarked fifty years ago, so 
long as historians furnish “complementary modern architectural materials,” the 
courts will “not have to rely upon scrap lumber, salvage bricks, and raw stones” 
when adjudicating constitutional cases and controversies from an historical 
standpoint.87  
This is not to say advocates—whether they are lawyers or legal scholars—will 
ever end the practice of “law office history.” It is the advocates’ roles to advance 
their causes by any means necessary. This includes compiling or cherry-picking 
historical evidence in their favor, all the while ignoring what a thorough historical 
inquiry provides or even discussing the limits of historical explanation.88 The 
interpretational consequences associated with “law office history,” however, are not 
in the hands of advocates.89 It is the judiciary that is the gatekeeper of how history is 
relevant to the respective case or controversy, the manner in which history in law is 
applied, and what historical evidence is to be admitted.90 Therefore, when historians 
                                                           
 85 John Phillip Reid, Bruce Ackerman, Kurt Lash, and Barry Friedman are a few notable 
examples. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(Wisconsin University Press 1986); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 
(Harvard University Press 1993); KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH 
AMENDMENT (Oxford University Press 2009); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: 
HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION (Farrar, Straus, & Giroux 2009). 
 86 For the rise of originalism and its continued appeal, see Jamal Greene, Nathaniel 
Persily, & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356 (2011); 
JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY (John Hopkins University Press 2005). 
 87 Murphy, supra note 2, at 78. 
 88 Melton, supra note 24, at 382-88.  
 89 Reid, supra note 82, at 203-5. 
 90 Wiecek, supra note 2, at 227-28. See also Berger, supra note 31, at 360-68 (discussing 
the problems associated with history in law, originalism, and judicial decision making, and 
judicial restraint). 
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provide the most accurate, thoroughly documented, impeccable history they are 
capable of producing, it operates as a counterpoise to the false historical claims of 
advocates.91 In fact, a number of jurists look to the writings and opinions of 
historians when history is presented to the court, for they feel compelled to operate 
under the assumption the history being presented by the respective parties is that of 
the law office variety.92  
Jurists like these are not seeking to perpetuate what Wood refers to as a 
“necessary fiction” or to engage in judicial mythmaking.93  They are not seeking to 
rewrite the past or proclaim one historical narrative is better suited for the present 
than another. Instead, these jurists desire to know whether there exists a sufficient 
historical foundation and its explanatory limits. In other words, they are in search of 
objective historical truths from which to legally reason. One cannot classify this 
pursuit under the subheadings of fiction or mythmaking. It is a reasonable inquiry.94 
What constitutes an objective historical truth—and whether there is such a thing—is 
debatable, but it generally depends on whether the respective historical claim 
qualifies as myth, theory or thesis. The three categories are distinguishable by the 
breadth of evidentiary record, the connection between pieces of evidence, and the 
historical methodologies employed by the historian.  
Let us begin with historical myth. It is an historical claim generally rooted in 
some form of societal tradition.95 In some instances, the myth is trivial and retains 
broad support from the populace such as the belief that George Washington’s teeth 
were made of wood.96 In other instances, the myth can have serious societal 
consequences, yet exists in only a subset of the population, such as the case of the 
individual tyranny model of the right to “keep and bear arms.”97 In any case the 
individual’s belief in the respective myth is not based on concrete historical 
evidence, its interconnection or the employment of even the most basic historical 
methodologies. Instead it is a historical claim that each individual chooses to believe, 
                                                           
 91 Murphy, supra note 2, at 77. 
 92 Taylor et al., supra note 46, at 1896, 1908; see also A. Raymond Randolph, Originalism 
and History: The Case of Boumediene v. Bush, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89 (2011). 
 93 Wood & Gerber, supra note 83, at 443. 
 94 Powell, Rules for Originalists, supra note 26, at 661.  
 95 Peter Heehs, Myth, History, and Theory, 33 HIST. & THEORY 1, 1-2 (1994).  
 96 CHARLES, supra note 1, at 85-86.  
 97 This understanding is part of the Standard Model Second Amendment. See, e.g., Randy 
Barnett, “Constitutionally Speaking” . . . About the Second Amendment, Remarks as Guest on 
New Hampshire Public Radio (Feb. 22, 2013), available at 
http://nhpr.org/post/constitutionally-speaking-about-second-amendment (“The reason why the 
militia was thought to be essential…is in part to protect a country from tyranny. In fact  . . . 
privately armed civilians have . . . been able to resist oppressive governments with organized 
militaries throughout the world. It is not always pretty and not always successful, but it does 
raise the cost of tyranny . . . .”). For an historical rebuttal to Barnett’s historical claim on this 
point, see Patrick J. Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance: A True Legal and 
Historical Understanding of the Anglo-American Right to Arms, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE 
NOVO 18 (2010). 
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whether that choice is a conscious or unconscious one.98 As historian Edward G. 
Lengel frames it, this is because individuals make cognitive choices that “reveal 
more about us”99 than they do about what the historical record provides. It is natural 
for individuals to “define themselves” through their own knowledge and beliefs of 
history rather than seek historical truth or clarity.100 
An historical theory may also be rooted in historical tradition, but unlike 
historical myths, historical theories are based on an evidentiary record, albeit an 
incomplete one. To state the premise more succinctly, historical theories essentially 
facilitate research agendas for other historians to prove or disprove. It is a history in 
progress so to speak. When an historical claim is categorized as an historical theory 
it can be due to any number of evidentiary factors. The historical evidence may only 
be loosely connected, retain significant gaps that require the historian to make large 
educated assumptions, or the historian may even openly admit he or she has not 
conducted an exhaustive search of the historical evidence. Whatever the evidentiary 
deficiency at hand, it creates a scenario where the historian has left the reader with 
more questions than answers.  
One prominent example of what constitutes an historical theory is Charles 
Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. Written in 1913, Beard 
asserted the framers were primarily motivated by wealth in adopting the 
Constitution. In doing so, however, Beard admitted his claim was based on an 
incomplete record and a number of historical assumptions. “The requirement for an 
economic interpretation of the formation and adoption of the Constitution may be 
stated in a hypothetical proposition which, although it cannot be verified absolutely 
from ascertainable data,” wrote Beard, “will at once illustrate the problem and 
furnish a guide to research and generalization.”101   
Where an historical thesis distinguishes itself from an historical theory is the 
level to which the evidentiary record speaks. While an historical theory retains a 
loose interconnection between pieces of historical evidence, an historical thesis 
maintains a substantial and intimately woven interconnection between pieces of 
evidence. Again, as with all historical claims, even an historical thesis requires the 
historian to make any number of assumptions, at one level or another, because the 
past can never be fully restored. An historical thesis, however, is built upon accepted 
historical methodologies intended to elicit context to the greatest detail.102   
Of the three aforementioned options—historical myth, historical theory, and 
historical thesis—the one that is closest to an objective historical truth is the 
historical thesis. Therefore, when it comes to the practice of history in law, historical 
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theses provide the most legitimate foundation from which to legally reason. It 
ensures jurists are relying on those historical claims that have been proven to a 
greatest degree of specificity.103 This is not to say it is completely illegitimate for 
jurists to reason from an historical theory. There will be instances where the only 
answer history can provide to a particular question is theoretical. In fact, a number of 
historical theories and interpretations may be available, leaving jurists with multiple 
options from which to choose. In some cases there will be a point of consensus 
among the competing historical claims, while in others there will be divisive 
conflict.104 Whatever the scenario, so long as the jurist acknowledges the existence of 
the competing historical claims, understands the historical limits of the evidentiary 
record, and retains historical consciousness when selecting a respective historical 
account from which to legally reason, the resulting historical foundation can still be 
legitimate because the jurist is being honest and forthright about his or her choice.105  
Illegitimacy can seep in in those instances where one historical conflict is built 
on another conflict, and so forth.106 To assume this approach to history in law is to 
openly engage in the myth-making process, which in turn leads to an illegitimate 
foundation for legal reasoning; the justification being historical myth is on the 
opposite spectrum to achieving an objective historical truth. It is the equivalent of 
importing an inaccurate statement of facts or relying on hearsay when deciding a 
criminal case. This does not mean, however, that the use or acceptance of myth for 
history in law is always illegitimate—an issue this article addresses in the following 
section.  
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF HISTORICAL MYTH IN CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE  
There are at least two scenarios (and perhaps others) where historical myth 
provides an acceptable foundation from which to legally reason. The first scenario 
takes place when a law or constitutional provision was drafted, enacted, ratified or 
universally understood under the auspices of a mythical historical narrative or 
construct. Although history in context informs us this narrative or construct is false, 
the fact of the matter is it was considered as true to the generation responsible for the 
law or constitutional provision at issue. It truly is a “necessary fiction” so to speak.107 
The second scenario can take place when the law, as currently constituted, is so 
reliant on a mythical historical narrative or construct that to correct it, and thereby 
overturn the legal precedent it established, would have severe consequences. In a 
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way, the second scenario is very similar to the rules of stare decisis. It requires the 
judiciary to adhere to the previously established foundation even if the historical 
construct is no longer true.108  
If one applies these two scenarios to the practice of history in law, the instances 
in which historical myth may provide a legitimate foundation to legally reason are 
somewhat frequent. Take for instance the Senate’s recent debate and vote over the 
Employment and Discrimination Act that would prohibit workplace discrimination 
against gay, bisexual and transgender Americans. Those senators that voted in favor 
of the bill did so by invoking what they perceived to be the spirit of the Declaration 
of Independence. “[This bill] is certainly about the vision of the Declaration of 
Independence that has the promise of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness as the 
founding motivation,” stated Oregon Senator Jeff Merkley.109  
Today, the perception of the Declaration as a bill of equity that offers the 
promises of equality, natural rights, and happiness is commonplace among 
politicians and the public.110 To borrow from Pulitzer Prize winning historian Jack 
Rakove, “The meanings Americans now assign to the Declaration of Independence . 
. . have relatively little to do with the circumstances of its creation or Thomas 
Jefferson’s purposes, and everything to do with the ideas of equality that, 
inadvertently or otherwise, it eventually created.”111 Yet, in the late eighteenth 
century, the Declaration was neither intended nor understood as affording such a 
promise. It was the legal means through which the American colonists declared 
independence to the world.112 Independence was sought for many reasons as was 
detailed throughout the Declaration’s grievances. These grievances were more 
nominal than real, with the actual impetus being the need to enlist foreign support for 
the war.113  
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Despite what the evidentiary record provides about Declaration at the time of its 
enactment, both its purpose and meaning have evolved from generation to 
generation.114 When the controversy over slavery and race intensified in the 
Antebellum Era (1800-1860), the Declaration’s pronouncement that “all men are 
created equal” had become a common talking point among politicians,115 particularly 
among abolitionists and women’s rights activists, who viewed the phrase as a 
political equalizer and embodiment of the promise of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness” for all.116 Proponents of the societal status quo, however, argued the 
Declaration did not actually promise civil and political equality. As Stephen A. 
Douglas stated in a debate with Abraham Lincoln, “[B]ut the signers of that papers 
did not intend to include the Indian or negro in that declaration . . . for if they had 
would they not have been bound to abolish slavery in every state?”117 It was this 
contextual view of the Declaration that Chief Justice Roger Taney espoused in Dred 
Scott v. Sanford: 
The general words [of the Declaration of Independence] would seem to 
embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar 
instrument at this day would be so understood. But it is too clear for 
dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included . . 
. for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the 
conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of 
Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the 
principles they asserted . . . 118 
If history in context matters, it must be admitted the Douglas-Taney view of the 
Declaration is more in line with the collective views of Thomas Jefferson, the 
drafting committee, and those enacting members of the Continental Congress. In 
addition to declaring independence to the world, the Declaration espoused the legal 
proposition that “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” were the constitutional 
foundation on which both the state and federal governments were to be based.119 
                                                           
 114 See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS AND IMPACT (Scott 
Douglas Gerber ed., 2002). 
 115 This can be found in various political platforms in the mid nineteenth century. See 
NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-1972 5, 13, 18, 27, 32 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald Bruce 
Johnson eds., 2d ed. 1961). 
 116 See Strang, supra note 10, at 417-23; ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY 101-10 (New York University 
Press 2004); PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE 197-200 (Alfred A. Knopf 1997); Linda K. Kerber, From the Declaration of 
Independence to the Declaration of Sentiments: The Legal Status of Women in the Early 
Republic 1776-1848, 6 HUM RTS. 115, 115-24 (1977). 
 117 CREATED EQUAL?: THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858 62-63 (Paul M. 
Angle ed., 1958). 
 118 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 410 (1856). 
 119 Patrick J. Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” in Our 
Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
457, 458, 464-66 (2011).  I have placed emphasis on the word “polity” because the Declaration 
of Independence is often mistaken as promising “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” to 
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, without regard to whether 
 
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/6
2014] HISTORY IN LAW 43 
 
What “all men are created equal” meant was that every member of the polity is to be 
afforded “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” on equitable principles.120  
Still, these historical certainties extinguish neither how the Republicans of the 
Reconstruction Era (1865-1877) viewed the Declaration, nor how they applied its 
tenets when proposing legislation to protect those freed by the Thirteenth 
Amendment.121 To them, the Declaration embodied a set of principles that 
government should strive for, particularly as it related to equal civil and political 
rights.122 For instance, during the debate over whether to grant Freedman the political 
right to vote in the District of Columbia, Illinois Representative John F. Farnsworth 
called upon the Declaration to rebut those members of Congress who would deny 
such a right: 
Our fathers, when they framed the Declaration of Independence, declared 
that all men were created equal . . . [what they meant], so far as . . . 
natural rights were concerned, that one man was equal to any other man. 
They declared, and made the declaration one of the principles of the 
Government which they established, that all men inherited the same 
rights. They declared that all men had the right to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness. And they said more than that. They said that 
Governments were instituted to protect these rights. They said that the just 
powers of government were derived from the consent of the governed. If 
that be true, if Governments are instituted among men deriving there just 
powers from the consent of the governed, will some gentlemen . . . tell me 
why this body of men who are under the Government have not the same 
right as I have to participate in it?123 
When the Senate took up the equal representation bill, Massachusetts Senator 
Henry Wilson also invoked the Declaration as embodying “sublime truths” that 
society has now accepted.124 “We stand as the champions of human rights for all 
men, black and white, the wide world over,” stated Wilson, “and we mean that just 
and equal laws shall pervade every rood of this nation . . . .”125 Ohio Representative 
Samuel Shellabarger echoed these sentiments during a House debate over the same 
bill. He hoped the equal representation bill would help restore the “spirit” of the 
framers’ Constitution, which he perceived as having been ignored by the judiciary 
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for seventy years.126 “I had hoped that the judiciary of the Government would begin 
to look at the Constitution in the light of the Declaration of Independence, which 
said, and as truly as gloriously, that ‘all men are created equal,’” stated 
Shellabarger.127  
The belief held among members of the Reconstruction Congresses that they must 
restore the framers’ Constitution was not limited to the concept of equal political 
representation. When debating the 1866 Civil Rights Bill, Massachusetts Senator 
Charles Sumner, Illinois Senator Lyman Trumbull, and Minnesota Representative 
William Windom each invoked the Declaration of Independence as legal 
authority.128 Windom, in particular, viewed the Declaration as a bill of equity: 
This [bill], I believe, is one of the first efforts made since the formation of 
the Government to give practical effect to the principles of the 
Declaration of Independence; one of the first attempts to grasp a vital 
reality and embody in the forms of law the great truth that all men are 
created equal and endowed by the Creator with the inalienable rights of 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. If there be any reasonable 
objection to the bill, it is that it does not go far enough. It assumes only to 
protect civil rights, and leaves the adjustment and protection of political 
rights to future legislation.129 
On April 9, 1866, over the veto of President Andrew Johnson, the Civil Rights 
Bill was signed into law by Congress as the 1866 Civil Rights Act, and it afforded 
equal rights to all males “without distinction of race or color, or previous condition 
of slavery or involuntary servitude.”130 Following concerns over the Act’s 
constitutionality, however, along with the fear that the Act would eventually be 
nullified upon the Southern States being readmitted into the Union, Republicans 
pushed for the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.131 Although one may assert 
that the 1866 Civil Rights Act and Fourteenth Amendment cannot be read in 
conjunction because they contain different wording and emerged from different 
political situations,132 the evidentiary record strongly suggests that both represented 
the same body of law,133 particularly as it relates to principles of equality.134  
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Hereto, in describing the intentions and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Republicans called upon the Declaration’s rhetoric. Illinois Senator Richard Yates 
was one such Republican, stating: “I would write in the fundamental and 
unchangeable law of the land, that the Declaration of American Independence was a 
verity, that all men were created equal; and having the powers which this Congress 
now has, I would prove my belief by making the Declaration a reality.”135 
Pennsylvania Representative Thaddeus Stevens equally pressed the importance of 
making the spirit and promise of the Declaration a living reality. In Stevens’ words, 
“[O]ur fathers made the Declaration of Independence; and that is what they intended 
to be the foundation of Government. If they had been able to base their Constitution 
on the principles of that Declaration it would have needed no amendment during all 
time, for every human being would have had his rights, every human being would 
have been equal before the law[.]”136  Then there was Pennsylvania Representative 
George F. Miller, who described Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment as being 
“so clearly within the spirit of the Declaration of Independence . . . that no member 
of this House can seriously object to it.”137 It was a position Vermont Senator Luke 
Poland echoed when he described Section 1 as “the very spirit and inspiration of our 
system of government,” which was “essentially declared in the Declaration of 
Independence and in all the provisions of the Constitution.”138 
Taken altogether, what this brief overview reveals is the Fourteenth Amendment 
was perceived by most Reconstruction Republicans as enshrining the Declaration’s 
promise of equality within the Constitution.139 Again, it is worth noting that members 
of the founding generation may not have perceived the Declaration as guaranteeing 
such a promise, thus making the Reconstruction Republicans perception more of an 
historical fiction than reality. It does, however, provide a case in point of utilizing a 
“necessary fiction” when analyzing the scope of a constitutional provision. This does 
not mean that the Reconstruction Republicans’ rehabilitated understanding of the 
Declaration modifies its late eighteenth-century meaning and purpose. It simply 
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means it is constitutionally legitimate for a lawyer, jurist or legal scholar to apply 
this “necessary fiction” when interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment;140 that is, so 
long as one acknowledges the Reconstruction Republicans’ understanding of the 
Declaration is not one and the same with the founding generation. To do otherwise 
would advance a Whiggish or illegitimate view of the past. 
In addition to the history of the Fourteenth Amendment providing an example of 
a constitutionally legitimate mythical narrative or construct of the past, it also 
provides a case in point where jurisprudentially correcting an historical narrative 
may have severe consequences—the complete resurrection of the amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. The clause stipulates that “[n]o state shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States,”141 and, since the Supreme Court’s 1873 decision in The 
Slaughterhouse Cases, has been jurisprudentially understood as differentiating 
between rights associated with federal and state citizenship.142 To this day, despite 
the breadth of historical scholarship showing the numerous inaccuracies with The 
Slaughterhouse Cases—particularly how the Court failed to incorporate the Bill of 
Rights to the States through the Privileges or Immunities Clause143 as its drafters and 
ratifiers intended—the protective scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
remains unaltered.144 As a jurisprudential alternative the Court has incorporated the 
Bill of Rights piecemeal through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
and in doing so, has extended its protections to citizens and non-citizens alike.145 
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Herein lies a consequence with jurisprudentially revising or correcting The 
Slaughterhouse Cases—the exclusion of non-citizens from substantive rights.146 For 
if the Supreme Court recategorized every incorporated right from the Due Process 
Clause to the Privileges or Immunities Clause it would prevent any number of rights 
from extending to non-citizens. As a counter point, those who support revising the 
jurisprudence of the Privileges or Immunities Clause assert that to ignore its intent 
and purpose is to deny United States citizens a number of rights from state 
abridgement, including the Third Amendment right against the quartering of soldiers 
in homes,147 the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury,148 the Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury in civil trials,149 the Eight Amendment right against excessive bails 
and fines,150 and potentially any number of unenumerated rights.151 Although this 
line of argument has proved tempting to many originalists and progressives, it would 
essentially create a jurisprudential vacuum152 that not only swallows up the rights of 
non-citizens, but would also wreak havoc on a number of state laws and regulations, 
as well as undermine a range of unenumerated rights such as the right to marry, to 
have children, to use contraception, and perhaps others.153  
Still, for many originalists and progressives, these concerns are either over 
exaggerated, mistaken or do not outweigh the benefits of a reinvigorated Privileges 
or Immunities Clause.154 Even assuming, though, that revitalizing the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause will have minimal consequences on existing constitutional 
jurisprudence, it does present the objectivity dilemma of conflicting history.155 As I 
briefly touched on earlier, to jurisprudentially rely on conflicting or dueling history 
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for constitutional interpretation calls into question the legitimacy of any subsequent 
legal analysis.156 This is not to say, however, conflicting history cannot be navigated 
in a legitimate manner. One option available is to find historical consensus where 
there is conflict or to follow the historical path of least resistance. What this 
embodies is relying on those broader facets of the evidentiary record that are not in 
historical dispute. Here the respective interpreter retains historical consciousness to 
frame the legal issue in historical terms, but to a lesser degree.157  
The other option available is to choose conflicting history where there is conflict. 
Indeed, to pick and choose between dueling historical accounts brings us into the 
arena of “law office history,” however, there are two baseline rules that can mitigate 
the abuse of the evidentiary record and prevent the interpreter’s own predilections 
from impacting the conflicting choice. The first rule requires the interpreter to be 
honest and transparent as to why he or she made the respective historical choice. 
Essentially what this entails is the retention of historical consciousness by weighing 
the purposes and consequences of each choice in total historical context. To commit 
a minor violation of “law office history” is acceptable, but to create a domino chain 
of conflicting history can have far-reaching consequences. This brings us to the 
second rule when choosing conflicting history where there is conflict—the 
interpreter cannot build conflict upon conflict. To state it another way, when the 
interpreter chooses one conflicting account over another the enterprise should not 
continue. To do otherwise is to participate in illegitimate mythmaking.158 
If the historically conscious interpreter applies either the ‘choose consensus 
history when there is conflict’ approach or the ‘choose conflicting history when there 
is conflict’ approach to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, he or she must conclude 
its jurisprudential scope is quite limited. For instance, to historically venture into the 
sphere of unenumerated “privileges or immunities,” such as economic liberties or 
natural rights, is perilous seeing that there is no historical consensus as to what, if 
any, rights are included. To state this point in different terms, to historically 
pronounce that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was generally understood to 
protect a series of economic or natural rights is to partake in judicial mythmaking 
because the interpreter must build one conflicting historical account on another.159  
                                                           
 156 CHARLES, supra note 1, at 116. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 116-18. 
 159 Boyce has aptly summarized this objectivity dilemma in the constraints of originalist 
theory, writing: 
If the [Fourteenth Amendment’s] framing generation had no common understanding 
of Section One, it is hardly surprising that a century and a half later there is no 
consensus among scholars as to its original meaning. Indeed, the quest for a single 
“original meaning” is a misguided one. The diversity of original understandings 
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commitments of that reasonable observer? In what contexts does the observer situate 
the text? What is the observer’s understanding of existing constitutional and legal 
norms? There is no neutral or objective way of answering these questions. Any 
attempt to reduce the multiplicity of possible original understandings to a single 
original meaning is a distortion and ultimately a falsification of history. 
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A different legitimacy problem presents itself as to the manner in which the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights to the States. Although there 
is an historical consensus that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the 
Bill of Rights, there remains scholarly disagreement about the historical era in which 
those rights should be examined. A number of legal scholars have claimed that a 
legitimate interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause requires an 1868 
understanding or application of the Bill of Rights, not the 1791 understanding of the 
founding generation.160 To be clear, there is a contingent of scholars that perceive the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment as a second founding moment.161 To them, 
the Fourteenth Amendment not only defines the rules pertaining to national 
citizenship and apportionment, but also ipso facto updates the Bill of Rights from 
any 1791 understanding to 1868.162  
This approach to constitutional interpretation may seem well and good to the 
historically uninformed, but it directly conflicts with what the drafters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment outright stated in debates and speeches. For one, the 
aforementioned statements of Reconstruction Republicans concerning the 
Declaration of Independence and its relationship to the Fourteenth Amendment 
undermine such an historical theory.163 At no point did any Republican assert that 
the Fourteenth Amendment updated the Bill of Rights. To quote, once again, from 
Pennsylvania Representative Stevens, the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ensure the Constitution was based “on the principles of [the Declaration of 
Independence] . . . for [then] every human being would have [his or her] rights, 
every human being would have been equal before the law[.]”164 Thus, to Stevens, the 
Fourteenth Amendment was not about updating the scope of constitutional 
                                                           
Boyce, supra note 36, at 86. 
 160 See Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas P. Stabile, On Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1431, 1439-40 (2009) (applying the 1868 view of the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 231-83 (1998) (applying the 1868 view of rights to a variety of 
constitutional amendments); Stephen P. Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the Second and 
Fourteenth Amendments, 4 GMU L. REV. 1, 18-33 (1981) (applying the 1868 view of the 
Second Amendment). 
 161 See Garrett Epps, Second Founding: The Story of the Fourteenth Amendment, 85 OR. L. 
REV. 895 (2006). 
 162 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 979 
(2012) (“An originalist who believes that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated against 
state governments some or all of the rights protected by the Bill of Rights should, in 
adjudicating cases under incorporated provisions, be concerned primarily (if not exclusively) 
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 163 See Greene, supra note 162. 
 164 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). 
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provisions, but about accomplishing what the founding generation could not—a 
Constitution based on true equitable principles.165  
In 1871, Ohio Representative and Republican, William Lawrence articulated a 
similar view of the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose, stating, “[I]t must be clear 
that [it] creates no new right, confers no new privilege, but is declaratory of what is 
already the constitutional rights of every citizen in every State, that equality of civil 
rights is the fundamental rule that pervades the Constitution and controls all State 
authority.”166 Then there are a number of statements by Ohio Representative and 
Republican John Bingham, the chief architect of the Fourteenth Amendment.167 On 
August 26, 1867, in a speech defending the Fourteenth Amendment against 
Democrat assaults, Bingham outlined what the Republicans hoped to accomplish—a 
revival of 1776. “How would [the] pretense of [Democrats] have sounded in 1776,” 
queried Bingham, “when those grand old men assembled in the convention at 
Philadelphia and issued that new evangel to the nations in which they declared that 
‘all men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with the rights of life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”168 To Bingham and other Republicans, the 
drafters of the Constitution steered away from these original principles when they 
compromised over slavery. It was an error Bingham hoped to correct, as well as the 
notion that state sovereignty was superior or equal to federal sovereignty.169 
Bingham went so far as to criticize those Democrats that would deny the restoration 
of the framers’ Constitution:  
These gentlemen say they are for the Constitution, the great Constitution 
which our fathers gave us. Let them read in the forefront of that 
instrument, those words that should be written this day upon the lintels of 
ever door in the land: “We the people of the United States, in order to 
                                                           
 165 Id. at 74 (statement of Representative Thaddeus Stevens) (“When the great and good 
men promulgated [the Declaration], and pledged their lives and sacred honors to defend it, it 
was supposed to form an epoch in civil government . . . . Our fathers repudiated the whole 
doctrine of the legal superiority of family or races, and proclaimed the equality of men before 
the law. Upon that they created a revolution and built and Republic. They were prevented by 
slavery from perfected the superstructure whose foundation they had thus broadly laid. For the 
sake of the Union they consented to wait, but never relinquished the idea of its final 
completion. The time to which they looked forward with anxiety has come. It is our duty to 
complete their work.”).  
 166 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., Special Session 151 (1871) (emphasis added). 
 167 Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of Congressman John A. Bingham and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589, 591 (2003) (“Bingham’s inseparable link 
with the Amendment makes him worthy of attention from both a legal and an historical view . 
. . his words may provide meaning or context for what has been termed original intent, 
meaning or understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Richard L. Aynes, On 
Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 103 (1993) 
(discussing the importance of Bingham’s views on contemporaries and the first federal courts 
to apply the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 168 THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Aug. 26, 1867, at 1, col. 5. 
 169 See, e.g., THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Aug. 12, 1868, at 1, col. 3 (statement of 
John Bingham) (the Fourteenth Amendment would “forever end the question of the 
sovereignty of a State being supreme over the sovereignty of the nation, and of the asserted 
right of State secession and of the right of any State to repeal the laws and the Constitution.”). 
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establish justice, do ordain this Constitution,” etc. I am for the 
Constitution, too; and equal political rights amongst all natural born 
citizens, in every station of life, is simple justice. Therefore I am for it, 
and in standing for it I but imitate the great majority of the people, who, in 
1787, formed the Constitution of the Government, and handed it down to 
us as a nation.170 
Three days later, in a speech delivered before the people of Cincinnati, Ohio, 
Bingham restated this proposition. The Fourteenth Amendment extended the 
“imperishable words of the Declaration [of Independence]” to the States, but did not 
alter the power of State and local governments to govern as the Constitution 
intended.171 “Let no man for a moment suppose that I, or the party with which I have 
to honor to act (could find source- is it which I have the honor to act?), desire to 
impair or change that admirable structure of general and local, national and State 
government, which was framed by those great fathers of the Republic,” stated 
Bingham.172 Two years later, after the Amendment’s ratification, Bingham once 
again described the Fourteenth Amendment in such terms, stating the Amendment 
was ratified so that the “original and declared purpose of the Constitution shall be 
carried into effect, lest justice shall be established in the land—the justice which 
secures to every man his due—lest liberty to all shall be secured under the shelter 
and sanction of American law . . . .”173  
Still, despite the lack of historical evidence showing the Fourteenth Amendment 
was intended to update the meaning and scope of the 1787 Constitution or the 1791 
Bill of Rights, a number of scholars insist otherwise. Take for instance University of 
Illinois law professor Kurt T. Lash, who writes: “[The Reconstruction] shift in the 
public understanding of individual liberty suggests that what we are after is not the 
incorporation of 1787 texts, but the public understanding of 1868 texts—in particular 
the meaning of Privileges or Immunities and the scope of congressional power to 
enforce these newly constitutionalized rights.”174 Then there is Columbia University 
law professor Jamal Greene, who argues, “There is little reason, in principle, for an 
originalist to privilege the meaning of an incorporated right circa 1791 over its 
meaning in any other year prior to 1868.”175 Although Greene acknowledges there is 
an argument to be made that the 1791 understanding matters, he finds it to be an 
implausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.176 
From a theoretical perspective there is an argument to be made that the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause ipso facto updated the Bill of Rights from 1791 to 1868.177 If 
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history in context matters, though, if it truly matters, claims like Lash’s and Greene’s 
must be cast out as contradicting the wishes of those who debated and ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Even if one applies ad hoc originalist methodologies—
whether it is original intent, original meaning, public understanding or some 
combination of all three—one will be hard pressed to conclude that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause updated the Bill of Rights. Certainly one could quote historical 
texts or statements by the ratifiers out of context, such as a speech by Massachusetts 
Senator Charles Sumner proclaiming, “Every constitution embodies the principles of 
its Framers,”178 and therefore conclude that Sumner believed the Reconstruction 
Amendments updated the entire Constitution according to 1868 terms. This line of 
argument, however, is nonsensical after reading Sumner’s next sentence, where he 
declared, “we cannot err if we turn to the framers; and their authority increases in 
proportion to the evidence which they have left on the question.”179   
The writings of constitutional commentators contemporaneous with the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment do not support Lash’s and Greene’s 
approaches to interpreting the Bill of Rights circa 1868 either. Take, for example, the 
work of Timothy Farrar, a former judge of the New Hampshire Court of Common 
Pleas, president of the New England Historical and Genealogical Society, 180 and the 
author of a treatise titled Manual of the Constitution of the United States of 
America.181 Concerning the application of the Bill of Rights to the States, Farrar 
viewed Barron v. Baltimore as being wrongly decided and felt that the Bill of 
Rights’ first eight amendments applied to the States.182 More importantly, like 
Bingham, Farrar did not perceive the Privileges or Immunities Clause as updating 
the Bill of Rights: 
In respect to the powers of the government, it is of the same general 
character as the last. It re-affirms some pre-existing power, but adds no 
new ones . . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of the United States . . . . This will 
scarcely be claimed by anybody to delegate any thing new to the 
government, or to prohibit the States from doing any thing which 
otherwise they might rightfully do . . . . Thus, it will appear, by a minute 
analysis of the fourteenth Amendment, that it contains no augmentation of 
the powers of the [State or federal] government.183 
The underlying point here is not to disparage the history surrounding the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the incorporation of the Bill of Rights or the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead it is to illustrate the limits of 
history in law, the ease in which the evidentiary record can be abused or misapplied, 
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and the interpretational consequences that may result from engaging in historical 
mythmaking. It is no secret that the practice of history in law is often portrayed as a 
legitimate means to preserve the Constitution’s integrity and purpose, yet with just a 
minor misstep one enters into the foray of illegitimate mythmaking. This does not 
mean that applying historical myth to constitutional interpretation is always an 
illegitimate enterprise. As was seen with the example of the Declaration of 
Independence, its reference that “all men are created equal” not only took on a 
different meaning from the mid to the late nineteenth century, but this meaning was 
crucial to the drafting and ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments.  
The acceptance of historical myth as a jurisprudential foundation is also 
legitimate where correcting it would have severe consequences. This was seen in the 
example of a reinvigorated Privileges or Immunities Clause. For one, to reboot over 
a century of constitutional jurisprudence would have severe consequences on a 
number of levels. Furthermore, because there is historical disagreement as to what, if 
any, unenumerated rights were understood to fall within the “privileges or 
immunities of the citizens of the United States,” a fully reinvigorated Privileges or 
Immunities Clause would end up facilitating historical mythmaking more so than 
restoring our past. Lastly, it would be redundant to reinvigorate the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause given that our constitutional jurisprudence already provides a 
method of incorporating both enumerated and unenumerated rights through the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  
Still, there is a compromise worth considering as the jurisprudence of 
incorporated rights moves forward. When the Supreme Court is again faced with the 
question of whether to incorporate an enumerated right within the Bill of Rights—
such as the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury, the Seventh Amendment right to 
a jury in civil trials or the Eight Amendment right against excessive bails and fines—
it could do so through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, albeit with a caveat. This 
caveat being the restoration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is merely to right 
the historical wrong in The Slaughterhouse Cases—nothing more, nothing less. This 
would restore the history of the Fourteenth Amendment to its proper place. In doing 
so, however, it should be acknowledged that the drafters, framers, and ratifiers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment were not ipso facto updating the respective 1791 right to 
1868 terms. They were for all intents and purposes correcting the defects of the 
framers’ Constitution.  
III. CONCLUSION 
Generally speaking, it is common for members of the legal profession to view the 
practice of history in law as not all that difficult of a task.184 It is a view that Justice 
Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner recently espoused in the book Reading Law.185 To 
Scalia and Garner, although the use of historical evidence to adjudicate legal 
questions may not “always provide an easy answer, or even a clear one,” it is the 
best interpretational approach available.186 Here, though, what Scalia and Garner 
classify as history is actually originalism. The two are not one and the same. An 
                                                           
184 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Scholarship: What Next?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 28, 
31 (1988). 
185 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 10, at 401. 
186 Id. at 402. See also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 802-05 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
54 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:23 
 
originalist inquiry is, for the most part, a textually focused examination on “legal 
meaning” at the time of a law’s drafting, enactment or ratification. In contrast, an 
historical inquiry is contextually focused or about finding as many objective truths as 
possible to recreate the past as a whole.  
What truly separates an historical inquiry, however, from an originalist inquiry is 
the degree by which myth consumes fact. Certainly, regardless of whether one is 
performing an historical or originalist inquiry, the methodological process takes part 
in generating myth.187 In terms of where the respective inquiries are to be placed on 
the spectrum of constitutional mythmaking, however, the standard historical inquiry 
is far less likely to engage in the process than its originalist counterpart. This is 
mainly because originalism is not so much about reasoning from known historical 
truths, but instead about recreating a hypothetical expected legal application of how 
a hypothetical reasonable interpreter understood legal text at a particular point in 
time. It does not help matters when originalists ignore how one legal text or doctrine 
connects intimately with others. One cannot take those portions of a legal past he or 
she agrees with, discard the others, and proclaim constitutional objectivity and, 
therefore, constitutional legitimacy.  
This is not to say that there are not instances where to legally reason from 
historical myth is constitutionally legitimate. As was outlined in Part II, there are a 
number of instances where a law or constitutional provision was enacted or ratified 
with a false historical narrative in mind. In such cases there is nothing wrong with 
relying on a mythical construct of the past when legally reasoning. Still, the 
interpreter should proceed cautiously because even in these instances the mythical 
construct has historical limitations.   
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